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Article 12

RECENT CASE NOTES
becomes liable upon the express covenants of the lessee which touch and
concern the land, the lessee remains liable on such covenants as well as on
others for the reason that one who has subjected himself to a contractual
liability cannot divest himself thereof by his own act. Jordan v. Indianapolis Water Co., 159 Ind. 337, 64 N. E. 680; Rector v. Hartford Deposit
Co., 191 Ill. 380, 60 N. E. 528; Powell v. Jones, 50 Ind. App. 493, 98 N. E.
646; Winenman v.Phillips, 93 Mich. 223, 53 N. W. 168; Tiffany, Landlord
and Tenant, Par. 157. The covenant to give over possession of the premises at the expiration of the lease "in as good condition as they now are"
being an express covenant, both lessee and assignee are therefore liable
thereon, unless the lessees were relieved from liability by release as they
claim. It is not controverted that there is no express contract of release,
and it is well established that an implied contract grows out of the intention
of the parties, and that there must be a meeting of the minds. Western
Oil Refining Co. v. Underwood, 83 Ind. App. 488, 149 N. E. 85; Boyd P.
Chase, 89 Ind. App. -, 166 N. E. 611; Irwin v. Jones, 46 Ind. App. 588, 92
N. E. 787. The evidence does not support the claim of an implied contract
of release since no consideration for the alleged release is shown, and it
appears that the appellant did not know of the assignment until November, approximately four months after Oddou had taken possession, when
the conversation in reference to the payment of rent is said to have taken
place. It was not necessary for appellant to give the notice to quit since
where the time is definite and certain in a lease, it will expire by limitation,
and no notice to quit is necessary; Barrett v.Johnson, 27 N. E. 983, 2 Ind.
App. 25; Mason v. Kempf, 38 N. E. 230, 11 Ind. App. 311; Millington V.
O'Dell, 73 N. E. 949, 35 Ind. App. 225; but the fact that said notice was
sent, and sent to Niezer & Co., is another circumstance showing that there
was no meeting of the minds of the parties on a contract to release Niezer
& Co.
K.J. M.
MASTER AND SERVANT--"'SIMPLE TooL" RuLE-AssUMPTION OF RIsKPlaintiff sued under the Federal Employer's Liability Act to recover damages for the loss of an eye, caused by defendant's alleged negligence. Plaintiff, 56 years old, was employed as defendant's section hand, and had
worked 18 months prior to the injury. One of his duties was to remove
old ties and replace them with new ones. For this purpose, plaintiff was
supplied with picks, claw bars, and crowbars. At the time of the accident,
one E was working with plaintiff and using a crowbar, plaintiff using a
pick. Plaintiff stood outside the rail where he could stick the pick in the
end of the tie and, by pulling on the pick handle, aid in removing the tie.
He missed the place in the tie at which he aimed and struck the ball of
the rail with the point of the pick. When the point of the pick hit the
rail, a chip from the point was dislodged, flew up and hit him in the eye,
blinding it. Plaintiff knew, at the time of the accident, that the point of
the pick was dull, that the handle was crooked, and that the head of the
pick was loose in the handle. Three other section hands testified, as did
plaintiff, that they had at various times made complaints to the foreman of
these defects in the tools, and that the foreman had said that new tools
had been ordered and would arrive soon. Plaintiff was very vague and
indefinite as to when these conversations with the foreman had taken place.
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Verdict for the plaintiff, and defendant appeals from an order overruling
a motion for a new trial. Held: Judgment reversed. The evidence clearly
showed that plaintiff had assumed the risk. Pennsylvania Ry. Co. v. Martin, Appellate Court of Indiana, March 14, 1930, 170 N. E. 554.
A pick is a "simple tool," and the master owes no duty to the servant
to inspect and know the condition of such tool; if the servant actually
knows the defects in such tool, or if the defects are palpable so that lie
should know of them, and he uses or continues to use such tool, he assumes
the risk of such use. Jenney Electric Light, etc., Co. v. Murphy, 115 Ind.
566; Meador v. Lake Shore, etc., Co. 138 Ind. 290; American Carbon Co. v.
Jackson, 24 Ind. 390; Vandalia Ry. Co. v. Adams, 43 Ind. App. 664; Beard
v. Goulding, 55 Ind. App. 398; Standard Oil Co. v. Helmick, 148 Ind. 457;
Crum v. North Vernon Pump Co., 34 Ind. App. 253; McFarlan Carriage
Co. v. Potter, 153 Ind. 107; Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry Co. v. Beale, 42
Ind. App. 588; Guedelhoder v. Ernsting, 23 Ind. App. 188.
The reason for the rule is that, in the case of simple, ordinary tools
which are known by the servant to be defective and which require no
special care or skill in their operation, the master can hardly be said to
have superior knowledge of the dangerous qualities of the tool; in such ease,
an injury occurring from the use of such tool is not the proximate result
of the master's negligence, but is the result of the assumption of risk by
the servant. Meador v. Lake Shore, etc., Ry. Co., supra.
This rule applies unless the master expressly or impliedly promises to
remedy the defect. But the mere fact that the servant complains to the
master of the defect is not enough to raise such a promise on the part of
the master; the promise of the master must be such as induces the servant
to continue in the master's employ. Indianapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v.
Watson, 114 Ind. 27; Hath v. May, 10 N. E. (Mass.) 807; Pennsy. Ry. Co.
v. Lynch, 90 Ill. 333; Louisville & N. Ry. Co. v. Kemper, 147 Ind. 561.
The rules announced in the principal case are undoubtedly the weight of
Indiana authority, and under the view which the court took of the facts
(which seems reasonable) the case is rightly decided.
R.C. H.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-AUTHORITY TO INDORSE INSTRUMENT-The trial
court made the following finding of facts:
"That on May 15, 1924, appellant issued to appellee its certificate of
deposit in the sum of $2,318.38, which said certificate was as follows
(H I): 'payable to the order of himself in current funds on the return
of this certificate properly endorsed.'" That on September 23, 1924, appellant in regular course of business received from Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago, Ill., said certificate, which bore on the back thereof the following
indorsement, to wit:
"Thomas Weiner
"ALEX COPELAND
"Farmers Bank & Trust Company, Fort Collins, Colorado
"Broadway National Bank, Denver, Colorado
"Northern Trust Company of Chicago, Ills.
"Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Ill.
"That on said date appellant paid to Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
$2,318.38; that prior to September 25, 1924, appellee placed said certificate

